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Introduction

There has long been an understanding, and indeed an expectation, that after a natural disaster humanitarian relief will emanate from international governmental and nongovernmental organisations and states, which stricken states will generally accept. 1 The current International Law Commission (ILC) drafting project regarding the protection of persons in the event of disasters includes an article which refers to the right of external actors to offer assistance to disaster-stricken states. Draft article 16 states that: 'In responding to disasters, States, the United Nations, and other competent intergovernmental organizations have the right to offer assistance to the affected State. Relevant non-governmental organizations may also offer assistance to the affected State'.
2
In his fourth report the Special Rapporteur on the protection of persons in the event of disasters, Eduardo Valencia-Ospina, noted that when a natural disaster strikes, evidence of international compassion is abundant. 3 The manifestation of such humanitarian practices gives encouragement to those seeking to strengthen an international sense of interdependence. However, the notion of the 'international community', while intuitively attractive as an ideal, is meaningless without further elaboration, 4 and its goals need to be instrumentalised. If a key value of the international community is the development of international solidarity then a natural disaster offers the perfect context for demonstrating this fundamental notions of state sovereignty, it is unfortunate, but perhaps unsurprising, that the language of the ILC Draft Articles is inconsistent and unclear. The articulation of duties and obligations appears interchangeably in the Draft Articles and Commentaries which hampers a full understanding of the project's implications. In an effort to offer clarification, it is submitted that a 'right' is legally empowering, an 'obligation' is an inescapable legal burden which can be enforced, 'responsibility' indicates how an entity should behave and a 'moral dictate' suggests a reflection upon conscience. Real definitional difficulties arise with the notion of a 'duty'. As will be discussed subsequently, the ILC texts use the term to convey both a legal obligation and something less strict than this. This definitional obscurity is aggravated by the likelihood that the Draft Articles will remain soft law. At the very least, it might be said that a 'duty' may entail a legal obligation but definitely conveys a strong encouragement/direction towards a particular course of action. In its lesser form, a 'duty' is unlikely to have an enforcement mechanism.
Given the current patterns of global wealth inequality and the increased impact of disasters upon impoverished and underdeveloped states, a 'duty to donate' appears attractive.
Indeed, the Special Rapporteur in his fifth report when discussing the contours of the duty to co-operate (draft article 8) noted that this duty taken together with a right to provide assistance raised a fundamental issue:
… the nature of cooperation has to be shaped by its purpose, which in the present context is to provide disaster relief assistance. Seen from the larger perspective of public international law, to be legally and practically effective the States' duty to cooperate in the provision of disaster relief must strike a fine balance between three important aspects. First, such a duty cannot intrude into the sovereignty of the affected State. Second, the duty has to be imposed on assisting States as a legal obligation of conduct. Third, the duty has to be relevant and limited to disaster relief assistance, by encompassing the various specific elements that normally make up cooperation on this matter. 7 However, as he acknowledged, given that the 'overwhelming majority' of states which submitted written comments in the Sixth Committee were focussed in their firm belief that no duty to provide assistance existed under general international law, 8 The Special Rapporteur was explicit that there is no intention to create any additional legal obligations for either affected states or assisting actors to engage in certain activities.
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As noted already, this comports well with the weak terms of article 16, that is, a right to offer assistance, but it sits slightly awkwardly with the article 8 duty to co-operate and article 14 regarding obligations of the affected state.
The ILC Project
Expectations of Assistance
As acknowledged, there has long been an understanding that following disasters, humanitarian relief will be forthcoming from states, international governmental organizations (IGOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) which stricken states will generally accept. Evidence of humanitarian practices gives encouragement to those seeking to strengthen an international sense of solidarity. Indeed, many of the current ILC draft articles reflect the historical presumption of available externally-provided assistance. 32 The good faith of external actors offering assistance is widely presumed (although not on an irrebutable basis). Expectations of assistance are further bolstered by principle 6 of the San Remo
Principles on the Right to Humanitarian Assistance 33 which notes that in the event of refusal of either offers of assistance, or access to the victims when humanitarian access is agreed upon, states and organisations concerned may 'undertake all necessary steps to ensure such access' according to humanitarian and human rights principles. 34 In recognising a right, this principle moves very quickly to suggesting a responsibility and significantly elevates the profile and potential power of assisters. There are at least two ways of reading draft article 31 Report on the work of the sixty-fifth session (n 30) 77. 32 Draft articles 10 and 11 concern cooperation for disaster reduction and the duty to reduce the risk of disasters respectively. See also draft article 13 (the duty of the state to seek external assistance); 14 (consent of the affected state to external assistance); 15(conditions on the provision of external assistance); 17 (facilitation of external assistance); and 19 (termination of external assistance). 33 San Remo Principles (n 25). 34 ibid, principle 6 (emphasis added).
16: either, conservatively, as a codification of existing, discretionary practice or, more progressively, as signposting the way for development of an obligation/duty.
Codifying and cementing the legal terrain
If external actors routinely fulfil the expectations of aid implied in notions of international cooperation and embodied in many general and specialised IDRL instruments (which will be discussed subsequently), is there any need for further legal codification?
Probably there is, because IDRL has historically been complicated and patchy to the extent that its identity as a discrete area of law has been challenged. outlines a duty of key actors to co-operate, and 9 outlining forms of cooperation. It also undoubtedly bolsters the power of draft Articles 13 and 14 45 which clearly put pressure on affected states to accept externally-provided aid. Taken together, it might be said that the overall Draft Articles point to a strong expectation of assistance from able actors which might 43 (emphasis added). 44 Report on the work of the sixty-sixth session (n 18) 130, para 4. (emphasis added). 45 Duty of the affected state to seek, and consent to, external assistance respectively.
in fact be read as a duty of offering. Whether or not such a reading is feasible, the question remains: should such a duty be included?
Arguably the ILC Draft Articles are not suitably equipped to impose duties of assistance and aid arrangements. However, while such arrangements might be more efficiently created and expressed in bilateral, trilateral or regional treaties which better estimate the type and extent of disasters likely to befall a region, a general duty of offering assistance is unlikely to compromise such existing arrangements. Indeed, a general duty could form a normative basis for treaty duties, and they in turn may provide evidence for the hardening of such a duty in a mutually reinforcing fashion. 46 Between them they may even produce an obligation of assistance.
The explicit articulation of such a duty (inherently tailored according to state capacity) would balance the ILC Draft Articles more clearly and do so without requiring external actors to behave any differently from their current practice. It would, however, remove the discretionary element of when, and to which disaster-stricken states, offers are made. Again, this would more clearly mirror the fettering of a stricken state's right to refuse.
The ILC is always very cautious to stress when a drafting project is codifying or progressing the law. This project is no exception -it comprises a good deal of progressive development.
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The difficult line to navigate is when there is a move from progressive development to creationism. 48 It is this latter possibility (and the danger of creating an obligation or implying secondary duties on the part of non-disaster-affected entities and the international community to respond) that alarmed some ILC delegates and states. 
Special Rapporteur's Preliminary Report (n 3) paras 9 and 42; Report on the work of the sixty-third session (n 37) para 285.
However, a proposed duty to offer assistance might not in fact be a creative revolution in international law. A duty (rather than a right) of assistance has legal antecedents in IDRL. Thus, draft article 16's terms articulate a right, the Commentaries strongly suggest the right should be exercised where possible, the rest of the articles are premised on the fact that the assistance has been offered and key IDRL referencing instruments suggest a duty of (actual) assistance and maybe even an obligation. This is confusing.
Duties/rights/obligations/responsibilities
What's in a name?
The articulation of duties and obligations appears interchangeably in the Draft
Articles and their Commentaries. One ILC delegate thought it better not to avoid focussing 50 Bruges Resolution (n 1) art V. 51 ibid art VI (emphasis added). 52 ibid art VI(2). 53 Mohonk Criteria (n 24) PtII(4) (emphasis added).
on determining rights and duties and opt for wording that simply encouraged states to offer and accept assistance in disasters. 54 Another approved of the Special Rapporteur's general preference for 'duty' rather than 'obligation' because it indicated something between a moral dictate and a legal obligation. 55 However, this leaves some obscurity and produces a chess game of language. As noted already, IDRL is in a complex state. It comprises soft law, treaty law, customary law, guidelines and codes, the status and enforceability of which is often quite unclear. In a sense, IDRL exemplifies the unstable nature and unpredictable outcomes of norms operating in a de-centralised legal system. By way of illustration, the Mohonk Criteria refer to both the right and the obligation of the international community to assist when disaster-affected states are unable or unwilling to provide aid. This assumes that a right also carries an obligation. Further, as noted above, the duties/rights/obligations of potential external donors seem to differ between the ILC draft Articles, the 2003 Bruges Resolution and the 1994 Mohonk criteria. So, if the ILC Draft Articles were designed to clarify matters, they may still have some way to go.
Terms
The commentary to draft article 1 refers to 'rights and obligations' of relevant actors, but draft articles 8, 11, 12, 13 all refer to a particular 'duty'. Committee. The Polish position has been noted already. Both Thailand and Sri Lanka also questioned the use of the word 'right'. Thailand considered 'duty' more appropriate since offers of assistance from the international community were part of international cooperation (as opposed to an assertion of rights). 60 The Sri Lankan delegation also urged a redrafting to present the offer of disaster relief as a positive duty of the international community. 
Status of different duties and rights
What is the hierarchical relationship (in terms of authority) between obligations, responsibilities, duties and rights? As noted, the current Draft Articles have an overarching theme of responsibility, they promote certain duties and recognise certain rights, but what do they actually do? While it has been suggested that they should be hortatory, facilitative and refers to a right not a duty, its interpretation will be guided by draft article 1. R2P's re-definition of 'responsibility' entailed a definite expectation of specific action (from the international community) 73 and political attempts to invoke R2P in the natural disasters context have been strongly resisted. 74 However, the ILC explicitly eschewed the language of 'responsibility' in the Draft Articles because of its transference into a term of art, 75 preferring instead the words 'duty' and 'role'. 76 The ILC's rejection of R2P does not necessarily mean that for external actors there is no responsibility at all in disasters, just no 'R2P responsibility'. As noted, a general theme of responsibility is returned to time and again in the Commentaries: 77 
Draft article 1 and responsibility
Draft article 16
Absent a specific prohibition restricting offers of assistance, some ILC members and states considered draft article 16 superfluous, 81 but this is not a universal view. The Special Rapporteur asserted that it operationalized Vattelian notions of solidarity (which had informed the ILC project since its inception. 82 It recognised the global interest in protecting stricken populations whose plight was straining the capacity of the affected sovereign state, while simultaneously confirming the centrality of the affected state's primary responsibility. 81 See, for example, Mr. Petrič's view that its necessary inclusion was 'debatable', Provisional summary record of the 3139th meeting) (n 10) 7.
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Special Rapporteur's Fourth Report (n 3) paras 78 and 84.
Rapporteur clarified that the draft article was concerned only with offers of assistance and not with the actual 'provision' thereof. Any such offers (either unilaterally made or in response to a request) were 'essentially voluntary and should not be construed as recognition of the existence of a legal duty to assist'. 84 This caveat was presumably included to reflect the anxieties being expressed in meetings by some ILC members and governments in the UNGA Sixth Committee. The Special Rapporteur was equally clear that there was no obligation on an affected state to accept an offer of assistance, although this was qualified by the terms of draft article 14 militating against bad faith refusals which as we have asserted, at its mildest, produces an unbalanced result. Of course stricken states remain the primary actor (draft article 12(2)), determine when national capacity is overwhelmed (draft article 13), can impose conditions on external assistance (draft article 15) and control when external assistance is required (and external actors require the affected state's consent). However, affected states are not hermetically sealed off from surrounding politics and are even more exposed and vulnerable and potentially less able to exercise (paper) choices, when in a weakened condition. Further, such provisions assume a functioning government still exists, which the aftermath of the 2010 Haitian earthquake, where large parts of the government apparatus were badly affected, shows is not necessarily the case.
Finally, these Draft Articles must be read in the context of pre-existing specialist IDRL instruments. Such instruments (which the ILC already heavily relied on for the provision saying that an affected state 'shall not' arbitrarily withhold its consent to aid) 85 are more definite in their sense of an obligation for external actors to assist. While some ILC members were keen that draft article 16 did not create positive duties and specific legal obligations on the international community (including both third states and international 84 Report on the work of the sixty-fifth session (n 30) 79. 85 (emphasis added) See commentary to draft Article 14, Report on the work of the sixty-sixth session (n 18), n p.123-126 organisations) it will be interesting to see if the final version of the Draft Articles reflects such a conservative position.
Offers by states
As regards assistance from third states, the Special Rapporteur cited the provenance be resisted. At the same time, as noted, such insistence on its own may not be enough to stop this particular trajectory and again a duty to offer might be distinguished from a duty to contribute.
Offers by international organisations
The Special Rapporteur considered offers of assistance from IGOs and other humanitarian actors as belonging 'to the acquis of the international law of disaster response'. 91 Such actors' assistance does indeed have a long recognition in international law.
In terms of instruments which specify the role of IGOs and NGOs, several UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions are relevant, 92 and indeed the World Health Organisation and International Atomic Energy Agency are specifically empowered in the event of global health hazards and nuclear/radiological accidents respectively. 93 The San Remo Guiding Principles on the Right to Offer Humanitarian Assistance also provide a right to offer assistance for the ICRC, UNHCR and other UN organisations and professional humanitarian bodies. 113 In the ILC debates regarding draft article 2 it was clear that there was no proposal to expand existing human rights. Absent a specific right of individuals to directly enforce cooperation, the duty to cooperate is thus more of a horizontal inter-state duty. 114 This fettering of the co-operative duty undoubtedly challenges the protective human rights ethos of the project and emphasises its imbalanced nature. However, as noted, this disinclination to re-understand the duty to co-operate was borne out of concerns regarding a possible duty to provide, rather than to offer assistance. A duty to offer would preserve the horizontal nature of the assistance-relationship and better retain a human rights focus for the project.
Human rights as a value rather than a context
The concept of human rights both describes the perilous context faced in disasters and represents a key value which informs the project on 'the protection of persons in the event of disasters'. 115 Thus, the selective invocation of the concept would seem indefensible and unsustainable. The human rights dimension of the draft articles needs to be discarded or made rational. If it is accepted that the world requires mutualised responsibilities, and that international disaster-assistance is desirable and should be safeguarded, can legal opportunities arise from wider human rights law, a context within which the draft articles will operate?
In fact, the idea of joint human rights responsibility is not new. Article 2(1) of the ICESCR refers to parties' obligations to take steps at the international level to secure Covenant rights, with more specific co-operative obligations being mentioned in articles 11, This section considers the dangers of a potential duty to offer assistance and whether they might be more illusory than real given the terms of the other draft articles.
Although the Draft Articles promote duties of cooperation and fetter affected states' rights to refuse aid, they do not divest stricken states of sovereignty. A certain threshold of harm must be reached both to trigger aid and to guard against unwarranted interventions.
Draft Article 3 defines disasters, and its commentaries refer to existing legal caveats stressing certain requirements 137 including an exceptional scale of damage and societal disruption.
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Temporary emergencies which stretch, but do not disable, a state are probably insufficient. 139 By stressing the primacy, but only the primacy, of an affected state, draft article 12 perhaps suggests that there exists an alternative option of non-consensual, external, dealt with regionally, draft article 8's terms regarding cooperation and draft article 10's duty to cooperate in disaster risk reduction, could perhaps produce a 'standing arrangement' regarding the types of assistance likely to be offered by neighbouring states either individually, or those to be filtered through a regional organisation. Injecting a preparatory dimension into a draft article 16 duty could mitigate any unwelcome assistance-deluge.
If the standing arrangement proposal is rejected or non-existent, requiring a call from stricken states, to indicate timing and type of assistance required, would allow them to exercise their 'margin of appreciation' 146 (although admittedly this assumes a stillfunctioning state apparatus). However, could draft article 13's 'duty to seek' assistance 147 equate to a request, or bypass such a requirement? This is unlikely. The drafters specifically rejected use of the word 'request'. To 'seek' assistance implied a broad 'negotiated approach'
and process, meaning that affected states did not have to seek assistance from every source detailed, 148 nor was automatic consent to any offers implied following a call for help.
Notably, 'request' tends to be used in the context of mutual assistance and between treaty parties where there is more trust. 149 Thus, draft article 13's inherent limitations mean that any potential right/duty to offer aid does not render an open season on stricken states and provides reassurance that any potential duty to offer assistance should not eliminate the capacity of stricken states to refuse aid. 
Conclusion
During the ILC deliberations on the right to offer assistance, Mr Saboia, noted parallels between the project's rationale that disasters are matters of international concern and the international interest in human rights protection. As well as this project being an 146 See n 104 and associated text and the commentary to draft article 12, Report on the work of the sixty-sixth session (n 18). 147 See also Bruges Resolution (n 1) art III, para 3. expression of solidarity, it could also be read as one of 'enlightened self-interest'.
151 His thoughts recall Judge Jennings' comments that an assisting state simultaneously defends itself when it defends another because there is an inter-mingling of the security of all. 152 By analogy, there is no telling when a state will be stricken by natural disaster and will need assistance. Further, a state weakened by natural disaster can be a breeding ground for numerous long-term threats that menace both internally and externally. While certain states in the Global South are often stricken, it is worth remembering that Hurricane Katrina and the Japanese tsunami and earthquake of 2010 occurred in highly developed, mature, market economies and international aid was still desperately needed.
A duty to offer assistance would lend a concreteness to the material edge of international solidarity. It would also complement the limited capacity to refuse aid as proclaimed by the ILC Draft Articles. If it is the case that in extremis politics should be suspended and humanitarianism should come to the fore, how can a duty to offer assistance, a duty of solidarity, be denied? Draft article 16 should not embody a right to do nothing.
151 Provisional summary record of the 3102nd meeting (n 55) 9. 152 Nicaragua (n 130) para 545.
